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ASSAULT AND BATTERY-RETAIUNG POSSESSION OF PROPERTY-JUSTIFICA-
TION.-STANLEY V. PAYNE, 62 ATiL. (VT.). 4 95.-A defendant, on the expiration
of his lease of a farm, obtained the landlord's permission to. leave a certain
box in the barn. Thereafter defendant visited the farm and told the then
tenant that the box was his and that he intended to take it. Held, that it was
not sufficient to place the tenant in the attitude of a wrongdoer so as to justify
the use of force and violence to get possession of the box. Rowell, C. J., dis-
senting.
The right to use force to retake one's personal property from the posses-
sion of another has been affirmed in some cases and denied in others without
laying down any general rule by which the cases can be harmonized. In a
few exceptional cases the party injured is allowed to redress his own wrong,
without calling on the aid of the law; 2 Rol. Abr. 543; providing he use no
more force than is necessary. Rex. v. Ait'ten, 14 E. C. L. 196. Whether the
force used is excessive or not is a question for the jury. Com. v. Clark, 2
Met. 23. For example, it has been held a good defense to an action for assault
and battery that it was made to recover money of which another had obtained
possession withintent to apply it on an execution. Anderson v. State, 6 Baxt.
603. As a general rule, however, the owner of a chattel which has come into
the peaceable possession of another has no right to retake it by force, whether
such possession is lawful or not. Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 263; unless he
can do so without a breach of the peace. Stuyvescent v. Wilcox, 92 Mich.
233. The public peace is a superior consideration to any one man's private
property. Therefore the natural right of recaption must never be extended
where such exertion must occasion strife and endanger the public peace. 3 Bl.
Com. 4.
BOUNDARIES-ESTABLISHMENT BY ACQUIESCENE-EFFECT.-LAUGHLIN V.
FRANcIS, 105 N. W. 360 (IowA).-Held, that a boundary line, established by
acquiescence of the owners and recognized as such for more than ten years, is
not defeated by a subsequent survey which does not recognize such line. ,
The authorities are clear and decisive on this point though based on dif-
ferent grounds. They purport to be based on the principles of agreement,
acquiescence, practical location, estoppel and statute of limitations. Tiffany on
Real Profierty, Vol. I., § 259. In many states continued recognition by
adjoining owners of a certain line as the boundary line between their lands is
conclusive on both. Tifany on Real Profierly, Vol. I, p. 58i. The court said
in Roberts v. Ivry, 63 Ga. 622, affirming a decision of a lower court, that
"the jury properly recognized the line which the early proprietor endeavored
to establish." Tradition being for one party and recent surveys for the other,
the jury supported tradition. Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 6ox; Bowman v.
Dulling, 39 W. Va. 61g; Dufiont v'. Starring, 42 Mich, 492, hold that a long
established fence is better evidence of actual boundary, settled by practical
location, than any survey made after the monuments of the original survey
have disappeared. The reason for these decisions is that it would give too
much encouragement to litigation to break up a well established line. If all
lines were subject to be corrected by new surveys the confusion of lines and
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titles would be incalculable. The general considerations of justice and ex-
pediency dictate that the rule followed in these cases is the better one. How-
ever, in a few states such recognition of or acquiescence in a line is merely
evidence in regard thereto and may be contradicted, Bohny V. Petty, 81 Tex.
524; Whitcomb v. Dutton, 89 Me. 212: Hathway v. Evans, ioS Mass. 267.
CARRIERS-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS BY SERVAmTS-DIFFERENT CREWS.-
HAYNE V. UNION ST. Ry. Co., 76 N. E. 219 (MAss.).-The conductor of one of
the defendant's cars threw, in sport, a dead hen at the motorman of the car
on which the plaintiff was riding, but missed the motorman and injured the
plaintiff. Held, that the fact that the conductor was a member of a crew of
a car other than the one in which the plaintiff was at the time made no differ-
ence as regards the defendant's liability.
Common carriers are under an obligation arising out of the nature of their
employment and on grounds of public policy to provide for the safety of their
passengers. Penn. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451. So they are liable for the wil-
ful or negligent acts of their employees which result in injury to passengers;
Gillenwater v. Madison &- Indanafiolis Ry. Co., 5 Ind. 339; there being a
special duty to protect passengers against the insults and violence of their
own servants; S. Kan. Ry. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398; as well as a contract with
the passengers to secure them against personal rudeness, abuse and violence.
Sjohn v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 'or Mo. 407. There seems to be no reason why
this doctrine of liability of the company for the acts of its servants should be
confined to those on a particular car and so it was held, in Atlanta St. Ry.
Co. v. Bates, 1o3 Ga. 333, that there was no reason why common carriers
should not be liable for the acts of all their servants and not merely the ones
having in charge the particular car on which the injured passenger was at the
time of the injury.
CARRIERS-PASSENGERS' EFFECTS (MoNEY)-Loss-LIABILITY.-KNIERIEM V.
N. Y. CENT. & H. R. R. Co., 96 N. Y. Supp. 602.-Plaintiff and wife were
passengers on defendant's railroad. Owing to an accident to the road, the
plaintiff sustained the loss of $I, 8oo carried in the hand bag of his wife. Held,
that to recover, the jury must be satisfied that the money or part of it was
necessary for a prudent person to carry, allowing reasonably for accident or
illness or sojourning. McLaughlin and Patterson, JJ., dissenting.
In a case decided in New York in x85o, it was held that carriers were not
liable for money carried by passengers in their trunks, even though the amount
was only sufficient for traveling expenses. Grant v. Newton, I E. D. Smith,
95. Similarly in Doyle v. Kiser, 6 Ind. 242, the passenger was allowed to
recover value of clothing lost in a bag, but not money. These cases have gen-
erally been overruled and it is held that passengers may recover for money
lost to the extent of that which is necessary, etc., for the journey. Johnston
v. Stone, 30 Tenn. 419; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. York, 2 Wilson, Civ. Cos. Ct.
App. (Tex.) 639; Merrill v. Grinnell, 3o N. Y. 594. The last case holds that
the amount of money to be recovered is to be governed by the requirements
of the entire proposed journey and not for a particular portion thereof. In
cases of gross negligence even more may be recovered. Jordan v'. Fall
.River 1?. Co., 59 Mass. 69. The carrier's liability does not extend to money
carried for the purpose of making purchases. Hickox v. Naugatuck R. Co.,
31 Conn. 281; nor to large sums not expressly put in its charge with notice.
Hutchings v. Western, etc. R. Co., 25 Ga. 61; Orange Co. Bank v'. Brown,
9Wend. (N. Y.) 85.
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CARRIERS-TERMINATION OF RELATxoN-NoTICE TO CONSIGNOR.--ADLER V.
Wxrx, 96 N. Y. SuPP. 736.-Where an express company transported the goods
to the consignee and tendered delivery to him, which the consignee refused to
accept, its duty as carrier was performed, and although it failed to notify the
consignor of the consignee's refusal to accept the goods, held that it was not
liable for the subsequent loss of the goods by theft, in the absence of pxoof of
negligence as a bailee.
This case seems to follow the general trend of modern decisions- Kremer
-v. Southern Ex. Co., 46 Tenn. 356; and the rule is well settled where a rail-
road company is the common carrier, that no notice is required. Greggv. 11.
Cent. Ry. Co., 147 Il. 55o; Merchant's Disfiatch Trans. Co. v. Hallock, 64
Ill. 284. But see American Sugar Refining Co. v. McGhee, 21 S. E. 383
iGa.). This doctrine, however, has been held to have no application to the
duties and applications of an express company where the undertaking is to
deliver in person; Baldwina v. Am. Ex. CO., 23 Ill. 197; and, it is. the duty of
such express company to notify the consignor of the goods, and when this is
done, the company is relieved of its responsibility as a common carrier, but
not before. Am. Merchant's Union Ex. Co. '. WOY, 79 Ill. 430.
CARRIERS-TORTS OF SERvANT-DAMAGES.-SEABOARD Ant LINE Ry. v.
O'QUIN, 52 S. E. 427 (Ga.).-Held, where a common carrier undertakes,
through its servants, to exercise its rights to eject from its cars passengers
who have been guilty of disorderly conduct, it acts at its peril in determining
their identity and the carrier will be liable for damages if one is ejected
wrongfully notwithstanding the good faith of the servant.
Directly supporting the decision in the above case are Higgins v.
Watervliet Turnfike &, Ry. Co., 46 N. Y. 23; Cooley on Torts, 63X; Cole-
.man v. N. Y. & etc. R. R., io6 Mass. x6o; Cincinnati &-c., Ry. Co. v. Cole,
29 Ohio, (N. S.) 126. A street railway company will be held liable for con-
ductor's wrongful ejection of a passenger from the car under a mistaken idea
that the latter was about to violate the rules of the company. Denver Tran.
Co. v. Reed, 4 Colo. App. 5oo. So it is liable though conductor actually is
forbidden to act as he did. Turner v. North Beach &- M. R. Co., 34 Cal. 594.
Such acts of ejection are within the scope of his agency. Terre Haute &- I. R.
Co. v. Fitzgerald, 47 Ind. 791. The reasons for these decisions is well stated
in Passenger R. Co. v. Young, 2X 0. St. 5x8; Go§ v. Gt. Nor. Ry. Co., 30
L. J. Q. B. t48, states that since the masters must act through
servants and they put persons of their own selection in positions requiring the
exercise of discretionary authority and with the means of doing the injury,
they have really caused it to be done and should be held liable. It is their
misfortune that they have trusted servants who have ventured to disobey in-
structions, but it ought not also to be the misfortune of others who had no
voice in their selection. Again by relegating the responsibility to the master
it will tend to make the latter more careful in his selection of servants,
thus safeguarding the interests of the passengers. The great weight of
authority is in support of these cases, but some few cases hold to the contrary.
So it has been held that the company is not liable when the servant exceeds
his authority. Hbbard v. N. Y. &- E. R. Co., iS N. Y. 455; Ill. Cent. R. Co.
v. Downey, 18 Ill. 259.
COMMON CARRIERs-PAssENGERS.-BUscH v. INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT
Co., 96 N. Y. SuPP. 74 7 .- Held, that one, by purchasing a ticket for transpor.
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tation on an elevated railroad, depositing it in a box provided therefor, and
going on the platform, becomes a passenger, entitled to treatment as such.
It is generally held, that one who enters a railroad station and purchases
a ticket intending to board a passenger train soon to arrive is a passenger;
Atchison, Tojeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hollaway, 8o Pac. 31 (Kan.);
Central Ry. and B'king Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461; and it is also held that the
contractual relation between passenger and carrier begins as soon as the pas-
senger comes within the sphere of peril incident to street cars, where a car
has been signalled and has stopped to take on passengers. Holzenkamfi v.
Cincinnati Traction Co., 2 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 357; O'Mara v. St. Louis
Transit Co., io2 Mo. App. 202. But the mere purchase of a ticket does not
make one a passenger. The ticket must be bought with the intention of tak-
ing passage on a train scheduled to depart within a reasonable time. Fremont,
Elkhorn and Mlo. Valley Ry. Co. v. Hagblad, ioi N. W. 1033 (Neb.); Van-
degrift v. West jersey and Seashore Ry. Co., 6o At. 184 (N. J.) In Lake
Street Elevated Ry. Co. v. Burgess, 20o Ill. 628, it was held that a party
upon the platform of an elevated railroad station, with the knowledge of the
company that she intended to take a train, was a passenger when approach-
ing to board a train.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAws-TERRITORIAL INE-
QUALITY.-PEOPLE EX REL. ARMSTRONG V. WARDEN OF CITY PRISON OF NEW YORK,
76 N. E. ii (N. Y.).-Held, that a statute regulating the keeping of employ-
ment agencies in cities of the first and second class is not, because it applies
only to cities of the specified classes, in violation of Const. U. S., Amend. 14,
guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws.
It has been found hard to define satisfactorily the police power of a state
It is held in the case of Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit legislation which is limited by the
territory within which it is to operate, but merely that all subjected to such
legislation shall be treated alike, and in the much-quoted case of Budd v. New
York, 143 U. S. 517, it is said that a statute operating equally on all elevator
owners in places having x3o,ooo population or more, though not applying on
owners in places of less than r30,ooo population, does not deprive the owners
of the equal protection of the law within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Where part of a state is thickly settled and another part has but
fewitihabitants it may be desirable to have different systems of judicature for
the two portions and the Fourteenth Amendment could never have been in-
tended to prevent this.4Missouriv. Lewis, Io1 U. S. 23. Mr. Justice Field, con-
curring in Butchers' Union Comnfiany v. Crescent City Coamfany, iii U.S 746,
says that the common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pur-
suits which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all com-
munities from time immemorial, must be free in this country to all alike upon
the same conditions and without any legislative restrictions.
CRIMINAL LAW-OBJECTIONS TO INDICTMENT-WAIVER.-KLAWANSKI ET AL.
V. PEOPLE, 75 N. E. 1028 (ILL. SuP.).-Held, that advantage can be taken upon
writ of error of an indictment which charges no criminal offense notwithstand-
ing a plea of guilty to it. Wilkin, Boggs and Hand, JJ., dissent.
In the case of Fletcher et al. v. The State, 7 Eng. 169 (Ark.) it was held
that by a plea of guilty the defendant only confesses himself guilty in manner
and form as charged in the indictment, and if the indictment charges no
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offense against the law none is confessed. Fatal defects in indictments may
be raised for the first time on appeal. Pattee v. State, iog Ind. 545; Can-
cerniv. Peofile, i8 N. Y. 128. But where the defect is merely formal and
curable by amendment it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Peo-
.Ale v. Kelly, 99 Mich. 82. So an objection that an indictment charging two
persons with a misdemeanor in running a horse race in the street of a town is
insufficient, because it does not allege that defendants ran together, is too late,
if taken for the first time on appeal. King v. State, 3 Tex. App. 7. But fail-
ure to demur to an indictment for burglary which charges that the defendants
entered, etc., with intent to commit a felony, without stating what particular
felony, does not waive the objection. Peolile v. Nelson, 58 Cal. 104. And
(as in case at hand) where defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted with-
out moving to quash, or in arrest, or reserving any exception, it was held in
Henderson v. State, 6o Ind. 296, that the indictment might be questioned in
the first instance in the Appellate Court on assignment of error, and several
courts hold that the sufficiency of an indictment may be questioned for the first
time in the Supreme Court on appeal. O'Brien v. State, 63 Ind. 242; Hays
v. State, 77 Ind. 450; State v. Caldwell, 112 N. C. 854.
CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO CONFRONT WITNESSES-CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROVISION.-CREMEANS V. COMMONWEALTH, 52 S. E. 362 (VA.).-Held,
that it is not error to force the accused into trial in the absence of his wit-
nesses, when it appears to the court that the motive is a mere pretext for
delay. Caldwall, J., dissenting.
The tendency has been to support this proposition. Hooker v. Rogers, 6
Cowen 577; King v. Pearce, 40 Mo. 223; The King v. D'Eon, i Bl. Rep. 5rQ.
The rule is the same in criminal cases as in civil cases. Peofile v. Vermilyea,
7 Cowen 383; The King v. D'Eon, sufira. The motion must show due dili-
gence to procure the testimony, and that there is a reasonable probability that
it can Le obtained; Robinson v. Glass, 94 Ind. 21x; and that it can be pro-
cured in a reasonable time. Brown v. Moran, 65 How. Pr. 349. The appli-
cant must know the witnesses' whereabouts, Carberry and Case v. Warrell,
68 Miss. 573. The Massachusetts' courts seem to hold that the witness must
be within the jurisdiction of the court. Com. v. Millard, I Mass. T. R. 6.
DEAD BODIES-MUTILATION-ACTION BY SURVIVING HUSBAND.-JACKSON V.
SAVAGE ET AL., 96 N. Y. SuPP. 366.-Held, that a husband has a right of
action for the dissection of the body of his deceased wife without his permis-
sion or without the permission of his wife given during her lifetime.
The question as to whether a husband or wife has a right of action for the
mutilation of the remains of the deceased has been much discussed. It re-
solves itself into a question of property in a dead body. There was at com-
mon law no such right of property. Lord Coke is reported as saying: " Ca-
daver nullius nibonis." Blackstone says,: "Though the heir has a property
in the monument and escutcheons of his ancestor, he has none in his dead
body or ashes." 2 Bl. Com. 249. Wharton says: "Gorfus humanum non
recebfit estimationem." In support of this view, Grfith v. Chorlotte C. &.
A. R. Co., 23 S. C. 25, held that an administrator of a deceased person had
no right of action for the mutilation of the body of his intestate. However,
to-day the great weight of authority is to the effect that there is such property,
,uasi-property, or interest in the dead body of a human being as to sustain
a civil action for its wilful mutilation. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, held
-that a widow has a right of action for the unlawful mutilation of the remains
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of her dead husband. This ruling seems to be more in consonance with our
enlightened and humane views.
DEED-DELIVERY-RIGHT OF RECALL.-NoBLE v. TIPTIN ET AL., 76 N. B.
x5i (ILL.).-Held, that where a grantor encloses a deed in an envelope and
gives it to a custodian to be delivered after grantor's death unless recalled by
him, there is no delivery of the deed, and it never becomes operative, although
delivered by the custodian after the grantor's death.
In general, a deed delivered by the grantor to a third person with direc-
tions to have it handed over to the grantee immediately after his death is
valid; Latham v. Udell, 38 Mich. 238; even though given to wife of grantor,
and grantor expressed dissatisfaction with terms of same two days before his
death. Squires v. Summers, 85 Ind. 252. But, if grantor does not part with
control by act, word, or both, the subsequent delivery after his death is not
valid. It was held in Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296, that where a deed is de-
livered to one in trust for the grantee to take effect at the grantor's death
unless he shall otherwise direct during his lifetime, and he dies without giving
any further directions, the deed, at the death of the grantor, takes effect as
his deed from the first delivery, it being said that a deed of this character
was in the nature of a testamentary disposition of real estate and was revo-
cable without any express reservation of that power. Belden v. Carter, 4 Am.
Dec. 185. But the weight of authority is overwhelmingly to the effect that
the grantor must loose control over the deed.
DIVORCE-COUNSEL FEES-ALLOWANCE TO WIFE.-DEAN v. DEAN, o6 N. Y.
SUPP. 472. Plaintiff's wife had left him and having obtained a divorce valid
in Ohio but void in New York, she married in Ohio. Under oath she denies
charges of adultery and asks for counsel fees. Held, that the above facts are
no bar to her right to counsel fees.
It is a well established rule that the court will make allowance to the wife
for the prosecution of a divorce suit, whether the bill be filed by or against
her. Amos v. Amos, 4 N. J. Eq. 171; Exarte King, 27 Ala. 387; unless
there is an undenied charge of adultery against her. Bissell v. Bissell. 3
How. Prac. 242. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the wife must not be
wholly in the wrong. Strong v. Strong, i Abb. Prac. N. S. (N. Y.) 358;
Miller v. Miller, 43 How. Prac. 125. So the case in hand presents an appar-
ent contradiction to the principle in the case of Munson v. Munson, 60 Hun.
(N. Y.) i89, where it was laid down upon good authority that a marriage in a
foreign state where a valid divorce had been obtained, was ground for divorce
on charge of adultery if in original domicile the divorce was void. In Blake
v. Blake, 80 Ill. 523, it is shown that the allowance is largely within the dis-
cretion of the court. But if the wife cannot easily defray expenses the allow-
ance must be made. Douglas v. Douglas, 13 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 29r. So
too, the pecuniary condition was made a test in Miller v. Miller, i Wkly. N.
Cas. 415.
EVIDENCE-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY-CONCLUSIoNs.-HAWLEY v. BOND,
105 N. W. 464 (S. D.).-In an action to recover property levied on, alleged to
belong to plaintiff and not to the judgment debtor, plaintiff was asked who
was the owner at the time of the levy, over an objection that the question called
for the witnesses' opinion, and not for a fact. Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to testify that the property was hers.
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Ownership of personal property, as a rule, can be proved as a fact; Pick-
ler v. Reese, 171 N. Y. 577; Rasco v. Jefferson, 38 So. 246 (Ala.); Steiner vz.
Tranum, 99 Ala. 315; and, if there is a real dispute as to the net effect of
these facts, these may be brought out in detail on cross-examination; Wi-
more on Evidence, sec. i96o; but there is authority for saying that when the
question of transfer is the direct issue in the case, then the best eVidence must
be produced. Simpson v. Smith, 27 Kans. 565; Street v. Nelson, 67 Ala. 504.
Still other authorities hold that the question of ownership is the opinion of a
witness as to a mere conclusion of law and hence is inadmissable. Dunlap
v. Hearn, 37 Miss. 47x; Richmond v. Brewster, 2 N. Y. Supp. 4o03; Babe v.
Baker, 44 Ii. App. 578.
LIBEL.-NICHOLS V. DAILY REPORTER Co. 83 PAC. 573. (Utah).
Defendant printed and distributed cards on one side of which were the
words "Vote for honest Jake Bosch for delegate," and on the other side
", Explanatory-Mr. C. A. Nichols owes the Daily Reporter Co. a balance of
$34.25 for printing done in 1894. Draw your own conclusions and vote for Mr.
Nichols if you think he is unable to pay." Plaintiff was candidate for the
office of delegate in a typographical union. Held, not libelous per se.
Bartch, C. J. dissents. It would be otherwise if plaintiff were engaged in an
occupation where credit was necessary.
LICENCES- MERCHANTS -PERSONS INCLUDED.-STATE EX REL. TOWN OF
SIGOURNEY v. NELSON, IO5 N. W. 327. (IowA).-Code Sec. 700 gives to
cities and towns power to define by ordinance who shall be considered tran-
sient merchants. Held, that this can be construed as a grant of power to
declare one engaged simply in soliciting orders or making delivery of goods
on behalf of another as a transient merchant, when, by universal acceptance
of the business world he is not such.
In the case of Seaton Hays v. The City of Cincinnat4 I Ohio St. 272, it
was held that it is not part of the franchises of municipal corporations to
change the meaning of English words; that where, under charter the council
was prohibited from assessing charge on persons bringing provisions to the
markets in wagons, etc., but allowing them to prevent huckstering and fore-
stalling, an ordinance defining hucksters as -any person, not a farmer or
butcher, who shall sell, etc., any commodity not of his own produce and
manufacture" and requiring such person to take out licence, is void. The city
council has no power under the city charter, to enact by ordinance, that solip-
iting orders for future delivery of goods shall be deemed and taken to be ped-
dling, within the meaning of the code, such soliciting not being "peddling"
within the proper meaning of the word. City of Davenport v. Rice, 75 Ia. 74.
The leading idea of a hawker or peddler is that of an itinerant or traveling
trader, who carries goods about in order to sell them and who actually does
sell them to purchasers, in contradistinction to a trader who has goods for
sale, and sells them, in a fixed place of business. Com. v. Ober, 12 Cush. 495.
A peddler fully embraces persons engaged in going through the city from
house to house and selling milk to different persons. City of Chicago v. Bar.
tee, ioo Ill. 61. Taking orders for goods to be manufactured is not peddling-
Town of Spencer v. Whiting, 68 Iowa 678. An ordinance requiring transient
merchants to pay a licence is discriminating in favor of resident merchant,
and in conflict with Art. I. Sec. 8 of the Constitution of the United States and.
void. The Town of Pacific function v. Dyer, 64 Iowa 38; The City of Mar.
shalltown v. Blum, 58 Iowa 184.
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MARRIAGE-COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE.-HEYMANN v. HEYMANN, 75 N. E.
1079 (ILL. Su.).-Held, that it is sufficient to constitute a common law mar-
riage if what is done and said evidences an intention by the parties to assume
the marriage status, and the parties thereupon enter into the relation of hus-
band and wife.
To make a valid contract of marriage it is essential that "the parties (1)
were at the time of making it, willing to contract, (2) able to contract, and (3)
mutually did contract in the proper forms and solemnities required by law."
i BI. Com. 439. By common law innumerable cases might be cited to show
that no celebration is necessary. Dumarsesly v. .Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh (Ky.)
368. Nor by civil law. Hallet v. Collins, io How. (U. S.) 174. But in Eng-
land, Mass., Md., and N. C., it has been held that celebration is necessary.
The Queen v. Aillis, xo Cl. & F. 534; Corn. v. Munson, 127 Mass. 459: Deni-
son v. Denison, 35 Md. 361; State v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 177; while
the Supreme Court of the United States and most other states have held
otherwise. Mreister v. Afoore, 9L6 U. S. 76. Even where statutory provisions
exist regulating the form and celebration of marriage, it is commonly held
that a marriage valid at common law, even though not solemnized in con-
formity with the requirements of statutes, will be held valid, unless statute
positively declares it void. Hargraves v. Thomnfison, 31 Miss. 2i; Court-
right v. Courtright, (Com. P1.) ii Ohio Dec. 412. Where parties agree to
take each other as husband and wife and do from then on live professedly in
that relation, this constitutes a valid marriage. Newton v'. Southworth, 7
N. Y. St. Rep. 130; Overseers v. Overseers, 2 Vt. 15i. But some public
recognition of it, such as living together as man and wife, is essential as evi-
dence of its existence. State v. Baldwin, 112 U. S. 490. Sexual intercourse
after agreement to marry is not of itself sufficient to consummate marriage.
Sharon v. Sharon, 72 Cal. 633.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--TAXATION-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT NOT TAX.-
ARNOLD XT AL. V. MAYOR, ETC., OF KNOXVILLE. 90 S. W. 469. (TENN.).-Held,
assessments for benefits of improvement are not within a constitutional pro-
vision as to uniform taxation, such assessment not being regarded a tax. Nail
and McAlister, JJ., dissent on the ground that, although authority in other
states holds with the majority in this decision, nevertheless it is stare decisis
to hold, in Tennessee, that a special assessment is a tax within the constitu-
tional provision.
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-COMBINATION OF PERSONAL AND GEO.
GRAPHICAL NAMEs.-W. R. LYNN SHOE Co. v. AUBURN-LYNN SHOE Co., 62
ATL. 4qg (ME.).-In the plaintiff's trademark geographical and personal names
were both combined in an original device bearing the words, "Auburn-Lynn
Shoes, Auburn, Maine." Held, that this arbitrary composite name of the
plaintiff's product, with the location of the manufactory expressly added,
undoubtedly constituted an impersonal trademark.
The unusual combination of geographical and personal names makes this
case noteworthy and unique. As a general rule trade marks cannot consist of
geographical names; Evans v. Von Laer, 32 Fed. 153; because their nature
is such that they cannot point to the personal origin or ownership of the arti-
cles of trade to which they may be applied. Castner v. Cafman, 87 Fed. 457.
But there is an exception where the adoption by the defendant is not so much
to indicate the place of manufacture as to intrench upon the previous use and
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popularity of another's trademark. Lea v. W olly, i5 Abb. Practice N. S.
(N. Y.) 5. And further where the geographical name, as applied to a certain
article of commerce, has acquired a secondary meaning; Seixo v. Provezende.
L. R. i Ch. 192; as where an injunction was issued against the defendant,
restraining them from the use of the word Aberon as applied to cements
Newman v. Alvord, 5i N. Y. 189, or for the use of personal names as trade-
marks. No man has the right to represent his goods as those of another of the
same name, Burgess v. Burgess, 3 D. M. and G. 896: for while one is
entitled to sell his own product under his own name, yet in doing so he must
be careful not to do anything to injure another having the same name. Wal-
ier Baker & Co., Ltd. v. Baker, 77 Fed. i8i. And if the plaintiff has first
acquired a reputation for the particular kind of goods, the defendant may be
enjoined from selling like goods, except in connection with a clear statement
indicating that they are not the goods of the plaintiff. A llegretti Chocolate
Cream Co. v. Kellar, 85 Fed. 643.
TRADE NAMEs-AcQUISITION OF PROPERTY THEREIN-PROTECTION FROM IN-
TERFERENCE.-COHEN v. NAGLE RTAL., 76 N. E. 276.-Held, that where amanu-
facturer of an article has acquired a right of property in a name applied to the
article of manufacture, it is fraud on him for another to use the word in selling
a similar article in such a way as to mislead the public.
In an early case it was held that while every trader has some particular
device, there is no reason for granting an injunction to restrain one trader
from using the same mark with another. Blanchard vz. Hill, 2 Atk. 484.
Beginning in 1783 with the case of Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Dong. 393 and in
1803, Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, there has been established the uniform fun-
damental principle of the right of protection to a trader in the use of his trade
device. The principle of the court is two-fold. The public have the right to
know goods of a manufacturer by his mark on them and he has a right to all
benefits resulting from this knowledge. Congress Sfiring Co. v. Rock S. C.,
45 N. Y., 29 . A name or mark may be valid as such and subject to exclusive
-use, even though since adoption it has become the common appellative of the
article to which it is applied. Celluloid Mfg. Co. vt. Reid, 47 Fed. 712. One
may not use his own name in a manner intended to defraud the public.
Brown Chem. Co. vt. Mreyer, 139 U. S. 540. In Elf Models Cigar Mfg. Co. v.
Gato, 25 Fla. 886, the defendant in error used his own name E. H. Gato as a
mark for his cigars, which the plaintiffs in error marked their cigars with the
name of a junior member of the firm G. H. Gates. This was done to take
advantage of former's reputation and was fraud.
TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-INvADING PROVINCE OF JURY - CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES.-CHIcAGO UNION TRACTION Co. V. O'BRIEN, 76 N. E. 34r. (ILL.).-
Held, that there is no presumption of law that an unimpeached witness has
testified truly, and an instruction to that effect is erroneous, as infringing on
the province of the jury.
It is not an error of law for the court, in its charge, in commenting upon
the testimony of a witness, to express an opinion as to his honesty. HoJfnan
v. N. Y. Cent. &. Hud. Riv. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 25. Moreover, the court
may instruct the jury as to the rules of evidence. Lamfie Vz. Kennedy, 6o
Wis. iio. But the credibility of witnesses and the effect of the testimony
given are matters coming within the exclusive province of the jury. Hollo-
way vz. Com., 74 Ky. (ix Bush) 344. And so it is error for the court, in its
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instructions to assume the truth of any fact in controversy. Finch v,. Ber-
gins, 89 Ind. 36o. And an instruction by the judge to the jury that they are
bound to believe a witness unless he has been impeached is erroneous. St. v.
Smallwood, 75 N. C. 104. The jury have the power to refuse their credit.
The Charleston Ins. &. Trust Co. v. Carver, 2 Gill (Md.) 427. They are
the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses. U. S. v,. Hughes, 34
Fed. Rep. 732. And further, they are under no legal obligation to believe
it if, from all the facts proved in the case, they think the testimony not
reliable. Creed v. Peofile, 81 Ill. 569.
